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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty years, state and federal policy makers have often been asked 
to restrict the criteria, or tests, on which insurance companies may base their 
risk categorization. Insurance companies have responded that it is fair and rea- 
sonable to charge groups with different probabilities of death or accident actu- 
arially fair rates for each group. The companies argue that if they are not allowed 
to make these distinctions, the result will be adverse selection with low-risk 
individuals self-insuring to a greater extent than is efficient and high-risk individ- 
uals overinsuring. 
This paper analyzes the efficiency of insurance companies’ incentives to use 
certain types of sorting devices-those that are themselves costly to society. 
Genetic screening, tests for the HIV (AIDS) virus, and criteria that require ex- 
tensive monitoring of behavior (e.g., cigarette smoking habits) all use real re- 
sources to separate risk groups. Such sorting devices do not necessarily enhance 
efficiency. Though the decline in adverse selection does increase total surplus, 
this increase may be more than offset by the resource costs associated with 
determining individuals’ risk levels. Still, the test may be used in private insurance 
markets, because the gains to low-risk individuals from the sorting come not just 
from the increase in total surplus but also include a transfer of wealth from high- 
risk people. So long as the low-risk people would be made better off by distin- 
guishing themselves, they will do so, and competitive firms will find it profitable 
to offer them lower insurance rates. 
The analysis is in the tradition of Spence’s (1973) signalling theory.’ Just as 
education yields a greater private return than social return in Spence’s model, the 
next section demonstrates that risk-sorting yields a greater return to low-risk 
individuals than to society as a whole. The basic point of inefficient costly risk- 
sorting has been made by Cracker and Snow (1986) who have also shown that 
price/quantity bundling to induce self-selective sorting, as proposed by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976), may be imposed inefficiently. Section II gives some intuition 
for these results. 
Sections III and IV extend the Cracker and Snow analysis in two directions. 
Section III considers the role of a consumer’s information about his own risk 
1 thank Ted Bergstrom, Paul Courant, David Lam, Jeffrey Mackie-Mason, Dan Rubinfeld, 
Hal Varian, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Bruce Schillo pro- 
vided excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors are my own. 
‘Since Spence’s seminal work, an extensive literature on inefficient self-sorting in labor 
markets has evolved. See Arrow (1973), Stiglitz (1975), Salop and Salop (1976), Wolpin 
(1977), and Weiss (1983). A parallel literature has developed on self-selective price dis- 
crimination. See Salop (1976), Varian (1981), and Borenstein (1985). 
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level. Even if consumers are unsure of their own riskiness, it is shown that any 
information advantage that consumers may have over insurance companies can 
lead to inefficient, costly sorting. Section IV analyzes complications from moral 
hazard. When consumers can intluence their risk levels, the possible inefficiency 
remains. In that case, the extent of the problem is a function of the correlation 
in the population between preference for risky behavior and preference for in- 
surance. 
Section V discusses the implications of this work for the current controversy 
regarding insurance testing for the HIV (AIDS) virus. The theoretical results in 
earlier sections are shown to imply that HIV testing is likely to be used more 
frequently than is efficient. Section VI concludes the paper and discusses some 
further extensions of this work. 
II. INEFFICIENT SORTING IN A SIMPLE MODEL OF 
COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKETS 
consumers in this market have either a low probabiIity of an “accident,” L, or 
a high probability, H. Each person knows the risk category to which he or she 
belongs, but there is nothing that can be done to change groups. (Medical history 
or driving record would be examples of such a distinction.) The proportion of the 
population that is high risk is p, where 0 < /3 < 1. People within each risk clas- 
sification are identical, though low-risk individuals may have different preferences 
than high-risk people. Insurance companies are risk neutral and all consumers 
are risk averse. Insurance companies sell contingent contracts that pay $1 in the 
event that the insured person has an accident. We assume that contracts are sold 
under constant returns to scale and that all companies earn zero economic profits. 
Inelastic Demand fur Znswance 
We consider first the case of infinitely risk-averse consumers who, thus, will 
always fully insure. That is, each person has a completely inelastic demand for 
insurance (contingent contracts) at the quantity equal to the loss that would occur 
if an accident took place. Perfectly inelastic demand, of course, insures that there 
is no adverse selection and, thus, no efficiency loss from pooling different risk 
types. If all high-risk people buy DH and all low risk people buy &, then the 
pooled price would be P = DL(l - p)L + D&H. 
Though there is no gain in total welfare from risk sorting in this case, a low- 
risk individual still stands to gain DL(P - L), or area A in Figure 1, if she can 
prove she is low risk. Thus, a test will be imposed under competition if the per 
person cost of the test, T, is less than the subsidy that each member of the low- 
risk group would pay with pooling, area A. Essentially, low-risk individuals are 
willing to pay T in order to receive an income transfer of A from the high-risk 
people so long as T < A. If T were only slightly less that A, the test would still 
be used even though the loss to high-risk types would dwarf the gain to low-risk 
types. 
Non-Zero Demand Elasticity for Znsurunce 
With utility functions that are strictly concave in income, consumers of each type 
will have a downward sloping demand for contingent insurance contracts. Figure 
2 presents the demand curve for a member of each risk classification. The quantity 
demanded by a high-risk person is drawn to be greater at any price than the 
quantity demanded by a low-risk person. This seems reasonable, because the 

















FIGURE 1. Pooling and sorting with zero demand elasticity 
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FIGURE 2. Pooling and sorting with non-zero demand elasticity 
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expected payoff is larger for a person at greater risk, but relative magnitudes of 
demand do not affect the analysis. 
Deadweight loss is minimized at zero in this market when all low-risk buyers 
purchase D,(L) one-dollar contracts and all high-risk consumers purchase D&xH).2 
This will occur in a competitive insurance market if members of each type can 
be costlessly distinguished. If insurance companies do not sort consumers by risk 
level, pooling will result, with a price, P, defined implicitly by 
p = (1 - PI * D,(P) * L + /3 * D,(P) * H 
(1 - P)*D,(P) + j?*DffcP) . 
Since P is a weighted average of L and H with strictly positive weights, it follows 
that L < P < H. Thus, if a pooling equilibrium obtains, there will be inefficiencies 
from the overinsuring of high-risk individuals (DWL,) and the underinsuring of 
low-risk individuals (DWL,), the standard adverse selection problem. 
We now again suppose that there is a way of testing individuals, at a cost of T 
per individual to determine whether or not they are low risk.’ We assume that 
the test is optional-a person can forego it and be classified as high risk-and 
that the test is errorless.4 Under these conditions, only low-risk people will take 
the test.’ 
The condition under which it is welfare improving to use the test is straight- 
forward.h The test should be imposed if and only if 
(I - p) * T -=c (I - p) * DWLL + p * DWL”. (2) 
The deadweight loss due to adverse selection must be greater than the resource 
cost of imposing the test. Alternatively, the compensation principle must be sa- 
tisifed, which will be the case if the dollar-valued gains to the beneficiary group 
ZIf the utility functions are not state dependent and the financial loss to a person from an 
accident is still the same whether he is low or high risk, then D,(H) = DL(L). Faced with 
actuarially fair insurance, a risk-averse person will fully insure. 
31t is assumed that the cost will be paid by the consumer, but in a competitive insurance 
market, this is not important to the results. 
4A requirement that all individuals be tested will only strengthen the results developed 
below. 
‘The test need not even be imposed 100% of the time for it to deter high-risk participation. 
If an individual tested must pay for the test whether he passes or not, then high-risk people 
will be deterred if the probability of being tested, pr, is high enough so that 
pr * (CS,XN) - T) + (I - pr) * (CS,,(L) - 77 < CS,(H). 
where CS(.) is consumer surplus as a function of price. In fact, by charging an infinitely 
large fee to those taking the test and refunding all but T only to those who pass, insurance 
companies could discourage high-risk individuals from claiming to be low risk while im- 
posing the test an arbitrarily small proportion of the time. The infinite penalty to those 
who fail is, of course, not realistic, but this does point out a procedure that could lessen 
the inefficiency. Still, the discussion that follows is unchanged in principle if the test is 
imposed with some probability between 0 and I so long as the probability is high enough 
to deter high-risk types. 
‘The discussion of welfare here refers to deadweight loss or total surplus in this market. 
These are inexact measures of the global efficiency of the insurance prices, but the results 
are unchanged in the more general, precise analysis, as shown in footnote 9. 
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are large enough to fully compensate for the losses incurred by others, that is, if 
the net change in surplus in the insurance market is greater than the cost of testing. 
This is not, however, the decision criterion that would be used in a competitive 
market. If the gain to low-risk buyers from imposing the test is greater than the 
cost they pay, competition will drive firms to offer the test and then charge a per 
contract price of L to the people who are shown to be low risk. Rather than 
comparing the cost of the test to the decrease in deadweight loss or change in 
consumer surplus of both groups, a competitive market would compare the test 
cost to the change in consumer surplus of only a low-risk individual.’ The market 
comparison omits consideration of the loss imposed on high-risk individuals. Thus, 
one might find the market using a costly test that increases the welfare of low- 
risk buyers only slightly after they pay the cost of the test, while it decreases the 
welfare of the high-risk group by a much greater amount.8 
Result I: In a competitive insurance industry, companies may use some costly 
sorting devices that decrese total surpiu.~.~ 
Though the pooling equilibrium may result in less deadweight loss than a com- 
petitive testing equilibrium, pooling does not Pareto dominate the testing equilib- 
rium. The loss of consumer surplus to the high-risk group from testing can be 
greater than the gain to the low-risk group, but only imposition of the costly test 
will induce high-risk individuals to reveal themselves. If a scheme were worked 
out for compensation of low-risk individu~s in lieu of testing, any individual would 
be better off claiming to be low risk. 
‘Consumer surplus is equal to total surplus in this case, because insurers earn no profits. 
*This argument can also be made in terms of deadweight loss. The test would be used if, 
and only if, 
T < (DAP) * (P - L) + D WI,,). 
It is clear that if 
(1 - j3) * D,(P) * (P - 15) > p * DWLH, 
then the competitive criterion permits use of some tests that increase deadweight loss. 
In a competitive market, however, this condition always holds. To see this, note that 
D=(P) * (P - L) is the payment that each low-risk person makes above the cost of insuring 
him when there is pooling. Since P is defined to be the breakeven price under pooling, the 
total subsidy from all low-risk people must equal the total subsidy to all high-risk people. 
That is, 
(1 - @)*&(p)*(P - L) = P*DH(P)*(ff- P) 
From figure 2, it is apparent that the term on the right includes and is strictly greater than 
/3 * DWLH. 
9The result can be shown more briefly, though less intuitively, in a more general model. 
In this analysis, the compensation principle implies 
where E(v) is an expenditure function and V(a) is an indirect utility function. The left-hand 
side is the gain to the low-risk people from the test (presumably positive if the test would 
ever be used). The right-hand side is the loss (also positive) to the high-risk people. The 
result is shown by noting that the test will be used so long as the left-hand side is greater 
than zero, a weaker test than the compensation principle demands. 
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FIGURE 3. Choice facing high-risk individuals under self-selection 
Inejjjcient Self-Selective Sorting 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) examined an alternate method of sorting that does 
not require an explicit test. They pointed out that adverse selection may be 
overcome with self-selective sorting by offering price/quantity bundles of insur- 
ance where lower prices are associated with smaller quantities of insurance and, 
thus, with a higher level of self-insurance on the part of the buyer.‘O They showed 
that with such bundles, the only equilibrium that can exist is one in which only 
low-risk individuals are induced to buy the low-priced insurance. The high-risk 
individuals are separated out, because self-insuring is more costly for them than 
for low-risk types.” 
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the conditions under which a self-selection equi- 
librium will exist. If the quantity of insurance that a person can buy at the low 
price is restricted to QI, an amount less than high-risk people would buy at the 
separating price, D,,(H), then high-risk individuals may choose to buy all the 
insurance that they want at price H rather than buy a limited quantity at price L. 
Writing consumer surplus as a function of both price and quantity now, because 
rationing may cause individuals to be off their demand curves, the first condition 
for a self-selective equilbrium to exist is that 
CSnW,DdW) > CS,vtL,Q,), (34 
that is, high-risk people prefer to fully insure at price H than to buy Qr at price 
L.‘* The horizontally striped area in Figure 3 must be larger than the vertically 
‘“Insurance companies offer such bundles by giving lower prices on policies with higher 
deductibles. Their motivation, however, may have as much to do with moral hazard prob- 
lems as with adverse selection. 
“Implicit in the analysis is the assumption that high-risk individuals get greater surplus 
from any given quantity of insurance than low-risk individuals. This is satisfied if the two 
types do not differ in their risk aversion or the loss they suffer if an accident occurs. 
‘*AS with the analysis in the previous subsection, the change in total surplus is an imprecise 
measure of overall welfare change. 
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FIGURE 4. Choice facing low-risk individuals under self-selection 
striped area. At the same time, however, low-risk individuals must be better off 
with the low-price, restricted-quantity bundle than under pooling: 
(3b) 
where P is from Equation 1. Otherwise, a different firm could offer unrestricted 
quantity at price P and attract both low- and high-risk types. The horizontally 
striped area in Figure 4 must be smaller than the vertically striped area. 
As Qr decreases from D,(L), (3a) is more likely to be satisfied, but (3b) is less 
likely to hold. Depending on differences in size, risk level, and risk aversion of 
the two groups, and on the size of the loss, Z, there may or may not be a Qr for 
which (3a) and (3b) hold simultaneously. If such a separating equilibrium does 
exist, it too could obtain even if it results in lower total consumer surplus than 
pooling.13 The cost of this type of sorting (or test) is the loss in expected utility 
to the low-risk group versus costless separation, because they cannot fully insure 
in this case. In Figure 4, this cost is the loss in consumer surplus represented by 
the dotted area. If the equilibrium Qr leaves low-risk people only slightly (or 
infinitessimally) better off than under pooling, then the loss to high-risk types 
13Rothschild and Stiglitz also show that pooling cannot be an equilibrium if firms are 
permitted to offer these price/quantity bundles. To see this in the terms of figure 3, note 
that the Q, for which CSH(L,Q,) = CS,,(~,D,,(xP)) necessarily has CS,(L,Q,) > CS,(P,D,(P)). 
Stated differently, start from a bundle with price equal to L and the associated restricted 
quantity, Qr, equal to D,(L). If this would not yield separation, begin reducing Qr and note 
that such a change will decrease consumer surplus more rapidly for the high-risk person 
consuming this bundle than for the low-risk person. Wilson (1977) shows that a self-selective 
equilibrium will always exist if the firms have somewhat more forward-looking conjectures 
than in Rothschild and Stiglitz. This is because a firm that might break the separating 
equilibrium with a pooling contract would recognize that it would in turn be vulnerable to 
losses when a new separating contract skims off only its low-risk customers. 
32 Risk Sorting in Insurance Markets 
from separation will be greater than the gains to low-risk types.14 Nonetheless, 
so long as there is some Qr that yields an equilibrium increase in the consumer 
surplus of low-risk individuals versus pooling, self-selective sorting will obtain, 
regardless of the resulting loss in surplus to the high-risk group. 
III. THE ROLE OF CONSUMERS’ INFORMATION 
Inefficient use of some sorting devices can result when consumers who know they 
are low risk insist on taking the costly test and then receiving the price L. In 
many cases, however, consumers do not know whether they are high risk or low 
risk. For example, an individual is unlikely to know ex ante whether a test for 
high serum cholesterol would indicate that she has a relatively high risk of de- 
veloping heart disease. 
An extreme case of poor consumer information occurs when every consumer’s 
best guess of her probability of passing a test is the proportion of the entire 
population that passes. That is, the consumer has no better idea of her chance of 
passing the test than the insurance company has. In that case, with buyers and 
sellers of insurance possessing the same information, there is no adverse selection 
problem. 
With symmetric ex unte information of this sort, no buyer would pay for a test 
that tells her whether she is high or low risk if the insurance company necessarily 
also received that information. To see this, note that if the buyer and the com- 
petitive insurance company have the same information, then insurance will be 
offered at what the buyer perceives to be an actuarially fair price. In response, 
the risk-averse buyer will fully insure. A test will change the price a buyer faces, 
but since she will still perceive it to be actuarially fair, she will still fully insure 
against an accident. Thus, a test will not change the quantity of insurance that 
an individual will buy. Since the companies break even before and after the test, 
while selling the same quantity to each consumer, the pretest price that all con- 
sumers face must be equal to their expected posttest price. The test would increase 
the ex ante variance of insurance premiums without decreasing any consumer’s 
expected payment. Thus, in this extreme case, no costly sorting devices would 
be used.15 
Still, if some consumers think that they have a higher than average probability 
of passing the test, they might, depending on their degree of risk-aversion and 
the cost of testing, perceive an increase in their expected utility from taking the 
test. The decline in expected utility that others in the population suffer from the 
test would not be considered in a competitive market. If the lower-risk consumers 
believe that their probability of passing is only slightly higher than the average, 
then the difference between socially optima1 and private incentives may be small. 
14Hoy (1982) points out the “knife-edge” Pareto comparison that is possible. As the gain 
to low-risk types from separation approaches zero, pooling Pareto dominates the separating 
equilibrium. 
“The point is related to one made by Chamberlin (1985). He argues that many tests would 
be banned if people had to make the choice regarding their legality from a Rawlsian “original 
position,” i.e., not knowing which category they would fall into under the test. So long 
as the adverse selection problem (once people learned their status) were not too great, the 
lower variance in insurance rates without the test (as seen from the original position) would 
be more valuable than the efficiency gain from using the test. Stated differently, people 
would like to be insured not just against an accident but also against having or developing 
the characteristics that would put them in a high-risk category. Also, see Schmalensee 
(1984) for an analysis of the equitability of imperfect sorting. 
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Still, the difference will exist so long as at least one individual believes that her 
probability of passing the test is higher than average. 
If uncertain consumers can take a test without necessarily revealing the results 
to their insurance companies, the possibility of inefficient, costly sorting increases. 
Such an option would have no effect on whether costly testing would increase 
total surplus, but “optional-disclosure testing” would increase the private incen- 
tive to get tested, provided that a finding of low-risk could then still be used to 
obtain lower insurance rates. If the test results are automatically revealed to the 
insurance company, then the test will be used if any consumer believes that 
Tr*CS(L) + (1 - ?r)*CS(H) - T>CS(P) (4) 
where m is the consumer’s subjective probability of passing the test and CS(.) is 
her consumer surplus as a function of price. I6 With “optional-disclosure testing,” 
failing the test will result only in remaining in the pooled group. The comparison 
then would be 
?T*CS(L) + (1 - 7r)*CS(P) - T> CS(P) (5) 
which is a weaker criterion since P < H. Clearly, making such tests unavailable 
in order to avoid asymmetric information is not feasible or, probably, constitu- 
tional. Still, the possibility of inefficient use of optional-disclosure tests is elimi- 
nated if the test results cannot then be used in rate setting. As discussed above, 
the cost of such a policy would be adverse selection. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF MORAL HAZARD 
Moral hazard is introduced into the model by assuming that people can choose 
whether to be low risk or high risk. This can be interpreted as the consumer’s 
choice of whether or not to engage in a risky activity or, conversely, as his choice 
of the level of precaution to take against an accident. The model is further gen- 
eralized by allowing individuals to have different utility functions. In addition to 
income and the price of insurance, an individual’s choice of low- or high-risk 
behavior now also affects utility. 
There may be some people who will choose to be low risk even when there is 
no testing. These people, for instance, do not like cigarettes. They would not 
smoke even if doing so would have no effect on their life insurance rates. Such 
people, designated type I, satisfy 
where V(e) is (indirect) utility as a function of income and the price of insurance, 
L and H indicate different indirect utility functions when the person is choosing 
to be low or high risk, and i indexes the consumer.i7 For all others, type ZZ 
individuals, (6) is not satisfied, so they choose to be high risk under pooling. 
It is useful to consider first a population in which no one would choose to be 
“‘The comparisons in (4) and (5) use consumer surplus, an inexact measure, as was done 
in section II. The more general statement, analogous to that in footnote 9, is omitted for 
brevity but is equally straightforward. 
“The fact that P is determined endogenously does not change the usefulness of these 
distinctions. For a given pooling equilibrium with price P, the population can be partitioned 
according to those for whom (6) is and is not satisfied. 
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low risk-nobody would take safety precautions or avoid high-risk behavior- 
unless he were rewarded with lower insurance rates. If no separation (and thus 
no such reward) based on risk level were possible or allowed, the resulting pooled 
price, with all customers engaging in high-risk behavior, would be H. In that case, 
no cross-subsidy would exist within the pooled group. If some people then re- 
moved themselves from the high-risk pool by becoming low risk and passing a 
test to prove it, the competitive price to the people who remained in the high- 
risk pool would still be H. Thus, the competitive criterion for use of the test is 
consistent with the compensation principle in this case; the change in the indi- 
vidual’s welfare from deciding to move to the low-risk group would constitute the 
entire change in total welfare from the decision. 
Result 2: When there are no people who would choose to be low risk under 
pooling-no type I individuals-the competitive criterion for use of a costly test 
is consistent with the compensation principle. 
Result 2 highlights the relationship between the change in price to the nontested 
group, when the market goes from pooling to separation, and the optimality of 
the competitive criterion for offering the test. If the price to the nontested group 
when the test is used-call this price N-is the same as the price without testing, 
the competitive criterion is optimal. It is more likely, however, that the nontested 
price would differ from the pooled price. If N > P, then use of the test makes 
nontested individuals worse off. This decline in welfare for the nontested group, 
however, does not affect the competitive incentive to offer the test to those who 
would benefit from taking it. 
Whether or not introduction of the test raises the price to those who do not 
take it will depend upon the mix of individuals who choose to take the test (and 
to be low risk). If, for instance, there were a positive population of type I people 
and they all took the test when it became available, then only people choosing 
high-risk behavior-some of the type ZZ’s-would remain in the nontested group 
and the price to that group would be N = H. Ix This would be above the price 
that obtained with pooling, when the type I people pulled down the competitive 
price to the pooled group, P < H. 
Though the N > P outcome seems the most likely, the opposite result is also 
possible. Testing could lower the price to the nontested group as well as to the 
tested group, resulting in L < N < P. This could obtain if, for instance, type Z 
people had systematically smaller demands for insurance than type Zl’s so that 
for many of the type Z consumers, it would not be worth the fixed payment of T 
to receive the low per contract price for insurance. The mix of people in the 
nontested group could then contain a higher proportion of people choosing low- 
risk behavior than had the pooled group when no tests were used. More precisely, 
the proportion of $1 contracts purchased in the nontested group by people be- 
having in a low-risk way could be higher than the proportion they purchased in 
‘“Some type II individuals who choose low-risk behavior with availability of the test may 
still be worse off than under pooling. It may be the case that 
V‘,,( Y;,Pl > vL,tyJl, but VHjYJrl < V,(YJ,) 
for some individuals. These people would prefer pooling and high-risk behavior, but when 
availability of the test causes the nontested price to rise, they prefer to switch to low risk 
and pay L. In a model with many risk types, the availability of the test could cause a 
complete “unraveling” in which all people choose to switch to lower risk with the test, 
but only a few, the equivalent of type Z’s, prefer that to the pooling equilibrium. 
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the pooled group when no test was used. The competitive price to the nontested 
group would then be lower than the price that had been charged to the pooled 
group in the absence of testing. These low-risk people would remain in the non- 
tested group, while many formerly high-risk people might switch to low-risk be- 
havior and take the test. In this case, the availability of testing would increase 
the welfare of even those who were not tested. This positive effect on the nontested 
group would be ignored in a competitive market and, thus, some tests that would 
increase total surplus may not be offered.i9 
Still, it is difficult to see how this result would be obtained very often. Type ZZ 
people get positive utility from being high risk, at least when insurance sells for 
P, while type Z people do not. Type ZZ people would have to pay T and give up 
their high-risk activity in order to receive price L, while the cost to type Z people 
would be only the price of the test, T. Thus, it seems quite likely that a higher 
proportion of the type Z than the type ZZ people would take advantage of the testing 
option if it were available. The result in that case would be N > P.20 
Result 3: Zf the proportion of contingent contracts purchased by type I individuals 
in the nontested group is less than the proportion purchased by type I individuals 
under pooling, then N > P and the competitive criterion for using the test is less 
strict than the compensation principle would dictate (that is, ‘too much testing’ 
under competition). Zf the proportion of contingent contracts purchased by type 
I individuals in the nontested group is greater than the proportion purchased by 
type I individuals under pooling, then N < P and the competitive criterion is more 
strict than the compensation principle would dictate (that is, ‘too little testing’ 
under competition). 
V. TESTING FOR THE AIDS VIRUS 
As with many ailments, modern medicine has developed a reliable test for in- 
creased risk of AIDS before it has found a cure for the disease.21 The highly 
accurate Western Blot test for antibodies to the HIV virus that causes AIDS costs 
about $50 per individual. A less conclusive, but much less expensive test, called 
ELISA, is available for about $10. Because an ELISA test will yield false positive 
results in 1% of all uninfected cases, a standard ELISA-ELISA-Western Blot 
19This result is not quite as strange as it might at first appear. Imagine a case in which 
nonsmokers buy very little insurance because they are quite physically fit, have a healthy 
diet, and otherwise live a clean (and long) life. It is not worth it for them to show that they 
are nonsmokers, since the cost of demonstrating this fact is large in comparison to their 
total insurance payment. Still, under pooling, they are burdened with high prices due the 
cost of subsidizing smokers, who live unhealthy lives and buy much more insurance. Even 
though the nonsmokers (under pooling) would all stay in the untested group when a test 
became available, the offering of a test might still benefit them by inducing some smokers 
to quit smoking, leave the untested group, and obtain lower insurance rates. For the 
counterintuitive result to obtain, these ex-smokers must find it more worthwhile to take 
the test than the nonsmokers, perhaps because they still take part in other unhealthy, and 
undetectable, behavior that raises their demand for insurance (or because ex-smokers are, 
for some reason, more risk-averse than nonsmokers). If this were the case, the result would 
be that the people who were nonsmokers all along would then be burdened by a smaller 
proportion of smokers in the insurance group (nontested) to which they belong. 
“As explained in the previous paragraph, the precise statement of this comparison is in 
terms of shares of contracts purchased rather than shares of individuals of each type in 
each group. 
*‘Costly tests now also exist for the genetic markers that indicate predispositions towards 
heart disease and Huntington’s chorea. 
36 Risk Sorting in Insurance Markets 
testing sequence has been established to minimize costs of detection and still 
control false positives. If the first ELISA test is positive, a second one is run. If 
that is also positive, the Western Blot test, with a false positive rate of 0.5%, 
follows. HIV infection is inferred if all three tests are positive. The sequence is 
stopped if a negative result obtains at any point.22 
The average cost of the testing sequence depends on the infection rate in the 
population being tested. If most people were infected, then the full sequence 
would be run on most people and the average testing cost per person would be 
nearly $70. If very few were infected, then even with the false positives that 
ELISA occasionally yields, most people would be labeled as seronegative on the 
first round. In that case, the per person cost would average closer to $10.23 
The cost of the HIV test is rather small, but so is the probability that any one 
individual will test positive. A widespread campaign of testing could be quite 
costly in comparison to the deadweight loss that it would prevent. Moreover, the 
test might have to be administered periodically because infection can occur or 
become detectable at any time. 24 Finally, the test costs generally estimated do 
not include the time cost to the individual being tested, which could amount to a 
substantial portion of the total cost. Efficiency in the use of these tests would be 
improved if they were used selectively, with the prescreening based on sexual 
preference, race, or nationality. For ethical and public policy reasons, however, 
such distinctions are unacceptable. 
If the adverse selection problem is not great and the number of infected indi- 
viduals is a small proportion of the population, the HIV test may not be worth 
using even for those who know they are seronegative. That is, the cost of the test 
could outweigh the benefits to low-risk individuals, so private insurance markets 
would choose not to use the test. This is more likely to be the case the more 
limited is the exposure of the insurance company if it (unknowingly) insures 
seropositive individuals. Thus, for smaller life insurance policies and for medical 
coverage, the tests may be omitted or optional. 25 Less extensive use of the test 
is also more likely if the psychological costs of testing are quite high even for 
those who are extremely unlikely to test positive. On the other hand, in cases 
where the opportunity for extreme adverse selection is greater, such as with life 
insurance policies in the millions of dollars, both the efficiency argument for testing 
and the private incentive to test will be much greater. 
It is quite possible that the decrease in rates on some policies (compared to 
pooling) for those who test seronegative would be greater than the cost of the 
test, but not so much greater as to satisfy the compensation principle. Those who 
‘>The false positive rates cited here are “Best-Case” results when tests are performed 
under ideal and monitored conditions. In actual labs, the rates may be much higher. Because 
both the Western Blot and ELISA tests indicate only the presence of antibodies to the 
HIV virus, which may not appear for one to six months after infection, either test will 
return false negative results for some period of time following infection. See Miike (1987) 
and Meyer and Pauker (1987). 
23These cost estimates are marginal cost, given that blood chemistry is already being 
analyzed for other reasons. If blood tests are to be run specifically for HIV testing, the 
average cost is likely to be around $75 for a low-infection population. See Mast (1987). 
24This is not the case for most individual health or life insurance, because the policies are 
commitments by the insurer to cover diseases contracted after insurance begins. Group 
policy rates, however, are generally experience-rated and are updated periodically. If a 
group, e.g., a company, were to have an abnormally high rate of AIDS cases, it might 
want to have all other members tested to show that the cases found were aberrations. 
25Estimates of the medical expenses from the time of AIDS diagnosis to death are in the 
range of $50,000. See Clifford and Iuculano (1987). 
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test positive or refuse to be tested would face greatly increased insurance rates 
or would become uninsurable. Furthermore, the costs to those found to be se- 
ropositive could extend far beyond the insurance market-to discrimination in 
jobs, housing, and social settings-if strict confidentiality were breached. 
Within the insurance industry the debate is not over whether HIV tests should 
be used but how extensively they should be used. At what size policy does it 
become cost-effective to require the HIV antibody tests? The calculation done 
within the industry compares the cost of the test (which is usually paid by the 
insurer) to the expected savings from avoiding writing policies for HIV-infected 
individuals.z6 When the decrease in expected payout on a policy-which in a 
competitive market translates into a decrease in premiums for those who pass the 
test-is greater than the cost of the test, the insurance company decides, or is 
forced by competition, to use the test. 
Ignored in this calculation, of course, is the loss to the small segment of the 
population who fail the test and become uninsurable or insurable only at much 
higher rates. It is clear then that the margin at which the insurance industry will 
draw the nontesting limit-the limit on the size of policy that may be purchased 
without submitting to the HIV test-is likely to be inefficiently low. If a test is 
just barely cost-effective, that is, just barely gives an ex nnte expected net benefit 
to those who are most likely to pass the test, then inclusion in the calculation of 
the negative impact on those who would fail the test will certainly make the test 
inefficient on total surplus grounds. 
This sort of marginal decision-making regarding which policies will require a 
costly test is common in the insurance industry. For decades, insurance companies 
have had “nonmedical limits” below which policies would be written without a 
medical exam. The decision criterion that companies use to set these limits is 
analgous to the competitive criterion described in Section II. Thus, the inefficiency 
due to excessively low limits is probably present in many other sorting criteria. 
In forming a public policy on HIV testing for insurance, the decision maker 
should be aware of the negative externalities that a private market decision to 
test would impose. For some policies, these effects could outweigh the possible 
gains from testing, particularly if adverse selection is not a severe problem in the 
market. Of course, there may also be positive externalities from insurance testing 
for the HIV virus, such as greater awareness of the dangers and of one’s own 
viral status, as well as counseling on methods of reducing the risk of acquiring 
and transmitting AIDS. If mandatory HIV testing for medical or life insurance 
would increase awareness and discussion-a view that is controversial among 
public health experts-then these positive externalities would also have to be 
considered.27 
Z6For instance, assume that a population has an overall infection rate of 1% and that the 
average cost of testing with this infection rate is $15. If the expected present cost of insuring 
an HIV-infected person is $3 per $1000 of insurance higher than the expected present cost 
of insuring an uninfected person, then the test becomes cost effective for policies of greater 
than $5000. In fact, calculations of this sort yield results that suggest much lower nontesting 
limits than are actually used by most companies. See Brodrick and Beal (1988). This may 
be explained by the nonmonetary costs that the test imposes on even those with low 
probability of infection. Such nonmoneta~ costs borne by uninfected consumers due to 
the test would cause the competitive market to raise the nontesting limit, as appears to be 
the case. 
Z7See Barry, Cleary, and Fineberg (1986), Clifford and luculano (1987), and Schatz (1987) 
for differing views on the information effect of insurance testing. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has explained why competitive insurance markets do not necessarily 
make efficient use of costly information. The basis for the result is simply that 
some people are made worse off when low- and high-risk people are put in separate 
risk categories by a costly test. This decline in the welfare of those who do not 
take and pass the test is not considered when a competitive company offers a low 
rate to people who can show that they are low risk. Because this loss is ignored, 
tests may be used that benefit a low-risk group only slightly and harm the remaining 
customers much more. 
It is worth contrasting this result with the efficiency of costless sorting. As with 
costly sorting, costless separation of risk groups harms those who are put in the 
high-risk group. In that case, however, Cracker and Snow have shown that the 
losses to high-risk individuals are necessarily smaller than the gains to low-risk 
individuals. In contrast, the gains to low-risk people from costly sorting may be 
largely expended in the sorting procedure and, thus, their net gains may be ar- 
bitrarily small. 
The work of Cracker and Snow has been extended here to analyze cases in 
which the consumer is unsure of her own risk level and to cases in which risk 
level is under the control of the consumer. The potential for inefficient risk-sorting 
generally persists in both cases, though the result may disappear or even reverse 
in some special circumstances that are identified. 
The simplicity of the basic result allows one to see easily the course that 
extensions to other cases would follow. For example, the test used might have a 
positive error rate. Nonetheless, if the low-risk types received a low enough rate 
upon passing the test to justify both the cost of the test and the increased price 
variance (ex ante uncertainty), the negative impact on other consumers, whose 
expected price would be likely to rise, would still be ignored. The incentive to 
use some inefficient tests would remain. 
The basic result is also robust to the number of risk types. Again, there would 
in all likelihood be some group of people who would pay a higher price because 
of the test. If such a group existed, their disutility would be ignored in a competitive 
market. Any person who is made better off by paying T and receiving a (perhaps 
expected) lower price would be accommodated regardless of the effect on others 
buying insurance. Thus, the assumptions of an errorless test and a discrete number 
of risk categories are not important in determining the inefficiency result. 
The results presented here indicate that social welfare might be improved by 
the prohibition of certain sorting devices used in insurance risk classification. 
Strictly interpreted, these results do not apply to such low-cost distinctions as 
sex, race, and age. A broader interpretation, however, might include recognition 
that when a group that has historically suffered discrimination is again separated 
out in insurance rate making, people in the group lose more than simply the higher 
rates that they might have to pay. The gains to the low-cost class might be less 
than the total loss to the high-cost class if the distinction also reinforces negative 
stereotypes and discrimination against the latter group. 
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